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Abstract
The use of non-cash methods of procuring fed cattle for slaughter has led to concern about 
the effect of these so-called “captive” supplies on cash market prices. Some empirical evi-
dence suggests that there is a negative short-run relationship between the two: Cash mar-
ket prices tend to be low in weeks in which captive supply shipments are high. We ad-
vance a different perspective on the relationship between captive deliveries and cash 
prices, arguing that the incentives that influence cattle delivery-scheduling decisions could 
lead to a negative relationship, not between the contemporaneous levels of captive ship-
ments and price, but between the volume of captive deliveries, on the one hand, and an 
ex ante expectation of a week-to-week price change, on the other. Econometric testing pro-
vides some evidence of this empirical regularity in the cattle procurement activities of four 
large packing plants in Texas in the mid-1990s.
1. Introduction
In procuring fed cattle for slaughter, beef-packing firms rely, to a significant 
degree, on non-cash methods commonly known as “captive” supplies and typ-
ically defined to include marketing agreements, forward contracts, and packer-
feeding of cattle.1 Growth in the relative importance of captive supply sources 
gives rise to a question of significant interest to individuals and firms engaged in 
the cattle business, and to government policy makers charged with the responsi-
bility of overseeing the operation of livestock markets: What effect does the use of 
non-cash procurement methods have on cash market prices for fed cattle?
1 All of these arrangements share the common feature that the cattle acquired via non-cash methods 
are committed to the packer at least two weeks in advance of slaughter, unlike cattle purchased by 
conventional “cash,” or “spot,” market means that are normally delivered to the plant within about 
one week of purchase. In 1999, 23.6% of steer and heifer slaughter by the 15 largest packers repre-
sented captive supply cattle (USDA, GIPSA, 2002.)
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One important step in answering this question is the characterization of the 
empirical relationship between captive supplies and cash market prices. There 
are several papers in the literature reporting evidence of a negative relationship: 
Loosely speaking, fed cattle prices in regional markets tend to be low in weeks or 
months in which the region’s captive supply delivery volume is high.2 Needless 
to say, however, the existence of this kind of negative correlation does not neces-
sarily imply a causal linkage through which increases in the use of non-cash pro-
curement methods cause the cash market price to fall. To determine whether an 
observed empirical regularity is a reflection of a causal relationship (in one di-
rection or the other), one must more closely investigate the economic mechanism 
underlying it. In our judgment, more work in this direction is needed.3 
This report does not provide a complete explanation of the dynamics of cap-
tive supply shipments and cash price. Instead, this report is similar in spirit to 
other studies that have sought, simply, to characterize the pattern of covariation 
between these two variables. While other studies have focused on the correlation 
between the contemporaneous levels of captive shipments and price, our work 
addresses a different aspect of the relationship. The empirical regularity that we 
investigate involves the volume of marketing agreement or forward contract de-
liveries in week t, say, and an ex ante expectation of the change in cash price be-
tween weeks t - 1 and t. In Captive Supply Delivery-Scheduling Decisions, we 
present two simple models of packers’ and feeders’ delivery-scheduling decisions 
that suggest that captive shipments and expected price changes might be neg-
atively correlated. These models will build on certain key institutional features 
of captive supply arrangements that will be described first in Some Institutional 
Features of Captive Supply Arrangements. Some econometric testing of our mod-
els’ predictions will be undertaken in Empirical Testing using a data set collected 
by the Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration (GIPSA) of the 
USDA. It provides a nearly complete record of the cattle procurement activities 
of four large fed cattle slaughter plants in the Texas Panhandle from early Feb-
ruary 1995 through mid-May 1996.4 Estimation results provide some support, 
though not conclusive support, for the predictions of the delivery-timing models. 
Whether the amply documented negative correlation between the levels of cap-
tive shipments and price could simply be an artifact of delivery-scheduling deci-
sions is a question that we leave for further research. 
2 Examples of studies of this kind include Elam (1992), Hayenga and O’Brien (1992), Schroeder, Jones, 
Mintert, & Barkley (1993), and Schroeter and Azzam (1999). 
3 We know of two theoretical studies (Azzam 1998; Love & Burton, 1999) and one experimental simu-
lation study (Ward, Koontz, Dowty, Trapp, & Peel, 1999) of the effect of vertical coordination of in-
put supplies on price in the residual cash market. Those studies, using models that are essentially 
static in nature, address the question of how the cash market price would be affected by a change in 
the share of input supplies procured through non-cash sources. Most of the empirical studies corre-
late cash prices with week-to-week variation in captive supply delivery volume. But the origins of 
the weekly variation in captive shipments are more complex in reality than in the theoretical mod-
els. Observed delivery volumes vary from week-to-week partly due to past decisions about the vol-
ume of captive supplies to contract for a given month, say, and partly due to more recent decisions 
about when, within that month, to schedule delivery. Because these two sources of variation are 
confounded in the data, it is not clear whether the negative empirical relationship has any bearing 
on the predictions of the theoretical models. 
4 Schroeter and Azzam (1999) provide a detailed description of the GIPSA–Texas Panhandle data. This 
report extends the analysis undertaken in section VIII.2 of that report. 
captive supplies and cash market prices for fed cattle     349
2. Some Institutional Features of Captive Supply Arrangements 
Cattle procured by non-cash methods include marketing agreement cattle, for-
ward contract cattle, and packer-fed cattle. In the GIPSA data collected for the Texas 
Panhandle study, marketing agreements were by far the most important non-cash 
procurement method, accounting for 73.1% of all non-cash cattle, and 21.0% of all 
cattle, slaughtered by the four plants during the period of investigation. Marketing 
agreements are standing arrangements between feeder and packer for transactions in 
fed cattle. The written agreements are often relatively vague with respect to the vol-
ume of cattle to be shipped over a given time period, sometimes mentioning an ap-
proximate number per year. The agreements stipulate that the cattle will be priced 
according to a formula. Generally speaking, formulas involve a base price, applica-
ble to cattle of given quality characteristics (typically defined in terms of a given yield 
grade, quality grade, and carcass weight range), and a system of premia and dis-
counts that are used to adjust the base price when the characteristics of delivered cat-
tle deviate from those of the base carcass. Base prices can be set in a variety of ways, 
depending on the formula. Nine formulas accounted for virtually all of the market-
ing agreement cattle purchased by the four plants in the Texas Panhandle sample. 
In all of these formulas, the base price is tied, in one way or another, to cash market 
prices paid the week prior to delivery of the marketing agreement cattle. For exam-
ple, in five of the formulas, the base price is set at the level of a USDA Agricultural 
Marketing Service (AMS)-reported price for fed cattle in the relevant regional mar-
ket the week prior to delivery. In the remaining four formulas, the base price is set at 
the level of a quality-adjusted average price paid by the packer for cash market cat-
tle slaughtered during the week of delivery of the marketing agreement cattle. But 
since the typical delivery lag for cash market cattle is approximately one week, this 
arrangement, too, ties the base price to the previous week’s cash market price.5 
The terms of marketing agreements typically give the feeder discretion over the 
number of cattle to be delivered each week. Each week, the feeder notifies the packer 
of the number of head planned for delivery two weeks hence.6 Once the volume of 
marketing agreement deliveries for a given week is set, the packer usually has dis-
cretion over the specific day or days of the week upon which delivery will be made. 
Forward contract cattle were the second most important non-cash source of fed 
steers and heifers in the GIPSA–Texas Panhandle study. This procurement method 
accounted for 18.2% of all non-cash cattle, and 5.2% of all cattle, slaughtered by the 
four plants during the period of investigation. Forward contracts call for the feeder to 
deliver a specific number of cattle to the packer within a specific month. The sched-
uling of deliveries across weeks and days within the month is left to the packer, how-
ever. Once the decision is made to deliver a certain number of cattle in a given week, 
there can be a time lag attributable to delays in arranging transportation. The GIPSA–
Texas Panhandle data suggest that the number of forward contract cattle delivered in 
a given week is normally decided either one or two weeks in advance.7 
5 For spot market lots of cattle in the GIPSA–Texas Panhandle data, the distribution of the lag, in days, 
between purchase and delivery has a mean of 6.98 and a standard deviation of 3.28. 
6 Appendix B of Schroeter and Azzam (1999) substantiates this claim with some evidence from com-
pany documents and interviews with feedlot personnel. 
7 For forward contract lots in the GIPSA–Texas Panhandle data, the distribution of the number of days 
from the scheduling date until the kill date has a mean of 11.88 days and a standard deviation of 
7.98 days. 
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The data identify lots of cattle purchased on forward contracts but are silent 
on the specific terms of the contracts. Certainly, the vast majority (perhaps even 
all) of the forward contract cattle in the sample were purchased on basis forward 
contracts. Ward, Koontz, and Schroeder (1996) describe this contract form: 
A packer bids a futures market basis for the month cattle are expected to reach 
slaughter weight and finish. The feeder then has the option of determining when to 
price the cattle (i.e., select a futures market price). From that futures market price, a 
cash selling price is computed, based on the agreed-upon basis…For example, as-
sume that after the basis contract is signed, a cattle feeder believes the futures mar-
ket price for the specified contract month has peaked. The cattle feeder notifies the 
packer and chooses the then-current futures market price, thereby also determining 
the cash sale price, based on the previously agreed basis bid. 
Thus, by the time the delivery month arrives and the packer comes to the point 
of deciding how to allocate the contract’s number of head across the delivery 
month’s weeks, forward contract cattle represent a fixed-price supply source. 
“Packer-fed” cattle are owned by the packer while the cattle are on feed. In 
the GIPSA–Texas Panhandle data, packer-fed cattle constituted a relatively small 
non-cash procurement source, accounting for only 8.6% of all non-cash cattle, and 
only 2.5% of all cattle, slaughtered by the four plants during the period of inves-
tigation. Because it is a relatively insignificant captive supply source in this data 
set, packer feeding of cattle will not be further addressed in this analysis.8 
3. Captive Supply Delivery-Scheduling Decisions 
This section presents simple models of the scheduling of delivery for mar-
keting agreement and forward contract cattle. Consistent with key institutional 
features of these marketing arrangements, the marketing agreement scheduling 
model has the feeder in the role of decision-maker with delivery volume deter-
mined two weeks in advance. In our model of forward contract scheduling, the 
packer decides the timing of deliveries either one or two weeks in advance. It is 
important to note that these models provide a partial analysis insofar as they an-
alyze the timing of delivery for a given overall degree of reliance on the captive 
supply source and a given price process, but do not consider how or whether 
these delivery scheduling decisions might feed back into the determination of 
cash market price and quantity.9
3.1 Marketing Agreement Delivery Timing Model 
Each lot of cattle owned by a marketing agreement feeder is characterized by 
the week in which the cattle are expected to reach optimal marketing condition. In 
our discussion, we will describe this as the week in which the cattle are “ready” to 
be delivered and we will use the term “t-ready cattle” to refer to the entire cohort of 
8 Packer feeding of cattle continues to play a relatively minor role at the national level as well. For ex-
ample, in 1998 for the 15 largest packers, deliveries of packer-fed steers and heifers were only 3.7% 
of total steer and heifer slaughter (USDA,GIPSA,2002). 
9 A complete equilibrium model of these phenomena is needed but is a challenging goal beyond the 
scope of this report. 
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a feeder’s cattle, typically including several lots, that are ready for week t delivery. 
Delivery of cattle before or after the week in which they are ready is costly to the 
feeder. For example, delivering cattle early, although it would hasten the receipt of 
sales revenue and save feed cost, would entail a price discount assessed against cat-
tle sold short of optimal market weight and finish. Delivering cattle late could incur 
a quality discount too, as well as the costs associated with additional feed and de-
ferred revenue. Early or late delivery would alter the timing of the purchase of re-
placement feeder cattle and this might also entail costs, depending on how feeder 
cattle prices are changing over time. Nonetheless, it may be in the interest of the 
feeder to deliver cattle either before or after the week in which they are ready if, 
by doing so, the feeder could take advantage of a favorable price movement.10 The 
wisdom of this kind of intertemporal arbitrage in delivery scheduling will be de-
termined by a comparison of the expected price change with the aforementioned 
costs, “arbitrage costs,” of early or late delivery.11 
The magnitude of arbitrage costs is affected by several factors. Some factors, 
like current feed prices, interest rates, and feeder cattle prices, are relatively ge-
neric in that they affect the arbitrage costs of all lots of cattle more or less equally. 
Other factors, primarily the current condition of the cattle, are “specific” in that 
they affect arbitrage costs on a lot-by-lot or even animal-by-animal basis. In gen-
eral, arbitrage costs for t-ready cattle are greater the further the proposed deliv-
ery week is from week t. To simplify the analysis, we assume that the nature of 
arbitrage costs is such that feasible delivery options are limited in the following 
way. For any given animal, there are only two feasible delivery weeks: the week 
that is best suited for delivery and either one week before or one week after. Ar-
bitrage costs for all other delivery options are assumed to be prohibitive. Thus, 
within a cohort of t-ready cattle, some cattle could be delivered one week early, 
in week t - 1, and some other cattle could be delivered one week late, in week t + 
1. This simplifying assumption amounts to an implicit restriction on the distribu-
tion of arbitrage costs within the cohort of cattle.12 
Consider the problem faced by a marketing agreement feeder trying to de-
termine, at week t - 2, the number of head of cattle to be delivered in week t. The 
feeder’s week t - 1 delivery numbers were irrevocably fixed in week t - 3, and it 
is possible that that decision committed the feeder to week t - 1 delivery of only 
some of his t - 1-ready cattle. The remaining cattle; numbering nt-1, say; would 
then be delivered in week t. Let Nt represent the number of the feeder’s t-ready 
10 Although we have not conducted our own survey of market participants to inquire about their deliv-
ery-scheduling decision process, there is limited anecdotal evidence that marketing agreement feed-
ers are aware of the incentives created by future price changes and even employ consultants to help 
them forecast these changes. Both Hausman (2000) and Schroeder (2000) comment on this in written 
statements submitted in conjunction with a September 2000 USDA public Forum on captive supplies. 
11 Some arbitrage costs, like the additional feed costs of late delivery, correspond to out-of-pocket expen-
ditures. Others, like price discounts for sub-optimal quality, are implicit opportunity costs. For sim-
plicity, we think of all arbitrage costs on an expenditure-equivalent basis. For example, sustaining a 
quality discount can be viewed as having to “pay back” a portion of the optimal-quality sale price.
12 To say that arbitrage costs are “prohibitive” for delivery two weeks early (for example) means that 
they exceed the maximum expected price decline over a two-week interval. Thus, our simplifying 
assumption really amounts to implicit restrictions on the joint distribution of arbitrage costs and 
week-to-week price changes. Without this simplifying assumption, our analysis of the delivery tim-
ing decision would have to take account of the fact that one potential advantage of a one-week de-
ferral of delivery is that it provides time to gather more data to inform the decision about a possible 
two-week deferral. With our simplifying assumption, this option value does not arise. 
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cattle that remain available at week t – 2.13 Let Nt+1 be the number of the feeder’s 
t + 1-ready cattle. The starting point for the determination of the feeder’s delivery 
numbers for week t will be nt-1 plus Nt, with two possible adjustments: Delivery 
of some of the Nt available t-ready cattle might be deferred to week t + 1, or deliv-
ery of some of the Nt-1 t + 1-ready cattle might be moved up to week t. 
Because arbitrage costs of early or late delivery vary within any cohort of cat-
tle, it is natural to model them as realizations of a random variable. Let Ce be the 
(random) arbitrage cost of early delivery within the feeder’s cohort of Nt-1 t + 
1-ready cattle. Let Fe, t+1(.) denote the distribution function for this random vari-
able so that, for any ce > 0, Fe, t+1 (ce) is the proportion of the Nt-1 t + 1-ready cattle 
with Ce ≤ ce. Because arbitrage costs are non-negative, Fe, t+1(ce). for any ce ≤ 0 and, 
because Fe, t+1(.) is a distribution function, F’e, t+1(ce) ≥ 0 for all ce ≥ 0. Likewise, let 
Cl denote the (random) cost of late delivery within the cohort of Nt t-ready cattle 
and let Fl, t (.) denote the distribution function for this random variable. Then, for 
any cl > 0, Fl, t (cl) is the proportion of the Nt t-ready cattle having Cl ≤ cl. As be-
fore, Fl, t (cl) = 0 for any cl ≤ 0 and F’l, t (cl) ≥ 0 for all cl > 0. 
The feeder, in week t - 2, forms a forecast of the price change that will occur 
between weeks t - 1 and t: Et-2 [pt – pt - 1]. Suppose that this expected price change 
is positive. Assuming risk neutrality, it would then be in the feeder’s interest to 
shift some t-ready cattle from week t delivery, in which they would receive price 
pt - 1, to week t + 1delivery, in which they would receive the higher price, pt.14 The 
cattle that could be profitably arbitraged in this way are those for which arbitrage 
costs are no bigger than the expected price change, and the number of such cattle 
is Fl, t (Et-2[pt – pt-1])Nt.
Next, suppose that the forecast of the price change is negative+ In this case, 
early delivery of some t + 1-ready cattle would be appropriate to take advantage 
of the relatively high price (pt-1) paid to cattle delivered in week t prior to the ex-
pected price decline. Cattle could be profitably arbitraged if Ce ≤ -Et-2[pt – pt-1], 
and the number of t + 1-ready cattle meeting this requirement is Fe, t+1(-Et-2[pt – pt-
1])Nt + 1. Finally, the total number of cattle that the feeder will commit to deliver 
in week t, qmt , is given by
Note that the second term in the expression for qmt is simply Nt if Et-2[pt – pt-1] ≤ 0 
and the third term is zero for Et-2[pt – pt-1] > 0. Differentiating: 
In either case, ∂qmt/∂(Et-2[pt – pt-1]) ≤ 0: Marketing agreement delivery volume in 
week t is inversely related to the expectation, formed in week t - 2, of the price 
change from week t - 1 to week t.
13 Just as the delivery of some t-1-ready cattle might have been delayed to week t, some of the t-ready 
cattle might have been committed, in week t -3, to be delivered in week t – 1. Thus, we define Nt to 
include only those t-ready cattle that are still available for week t delivery. 
14 The marketing agreement formula price for cattle delivered in week t is tied to pt-1 through the con-
nection between the formula’s “base price” and spot prices in week t – 1. In this analysis, we as-
sume that the price paid to marketing agreement cattle delivered in week t is simply pt-1. 
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3.2 Forward Contract Delivery Timing Model
To help illuminate factors affecting the timing of contract cattle delivery, we 
resort to a simple two-period analysis, much as we did in the model of market-
ing agreement delivery timing. Imagine a packer with cattle under contract for 
delivery in weeks t or t + 1. The total number of cattle under contract consists of 
Nt t-ready and Nt +1 t + 1-ready cattle. The packer’s total procurement targets for 
weeks t and t + 1 are Qt and Qt+1 head of cattle respectively.15 In each of the two 
weeks, any shortfall of contract deliveries relative to these targets will be made 
up with deliveries of spot market cattle purchased the week prior to delivery.
As a natural counterpart to our assumptions in the model of marketing agree-
ment delivery timing, we assume here that the packer could opt to order delivery 
of some of the contract cattle in a week before or after the week in which they are 
ready. This would involve a cost, however, due to the sub-optimal quality of cat-
tle delivered “off-schedule.” Our ad hoc treatment of these costs is to model them as 
an increasing, convex function of the number of cattle delivered off-schedule: c(q) 
where q denotes the volume of off schedule deliveries and c’(q) > 0, c”(q) > 0 for all 
q ≥ 0. Costs of off-schedule delivery would obviously be increasing in the volume 
of cattle delivered early or late. The assumption of a positive second derivative re-
flects the fact that, within the cohort of t-ready cattle, for example, different lots, 
or different animals within any given lot, would sustain different degrees of qual-
ity degradation as a result of late delivery. Because the first lots chosen for deliv-
ery postponement would be those that could be arbitraged at least cost, the per-head 
costs of late delivery would increase as the volume of late deliveries increases.16 
For τ = t or t + 1, let qcτ denote the number of contract deliveries ordered for 
week τ. Since contract deliveries for the two weeks must total Nt + Nt+1, we have 
qct+1 = Nt + Nt+1 -qct. Spot purchases will make up the balance of procurement tar-
gets in each week: 
where qsτ denotes spot market purchases in week τ - 1 for delivery in week τ. If 
the packer orders week t delivery of more than the number of t-ready cattle un-
der contract, so that qct > Nt, the cost of early delivery of some of the t + 1-ready 
cattle is c(qct - Nt). On the other hand, if delivery of some of the t-ready cattle is 
postponed, so that qct < Nt, the cost of late delivery is c(Nt - qct). In either case, 
costs of off-schedule delivery are captured by c(|6qct - Nt|).
Assuming a two-week lag between scheduling and delivery of contract cattle, 
the delivery timing decision will be made in week t – 2. In view of the nature of 
forward contracts, the acquisition cost of the contract cattle will, by then, be sunk. 
15 For simplicity, we treat these procurement “targets” as predetermined in this analysis focusing on 
the packer’s decision regarding procurement method. In a more complete model, total procure-
ment would also be treated as endogenous. 
16 For simplicity in the exposition, we treat the costs of early and late delivery symmetrically. Little 
would change if we allowed asymmetric costs of off-schedule delivery. 
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So the packer’s objective is to schedule contract deliveries to minimize the ex-
pected spot market costs and off-schedule delivery costs of meeting procurement 
targets for weeks t and t + 1: 
subject to max {0, Nt + Nt+1 – Qt+1} ≤ qct ≤ min {Qt , Nt + Nt+1}. An interior solution 
with qct > Nt must satisfy the first order condition 
which can hold only if Et-2[pt – pt-1] < 0: It is optimal for the packer to deliver con-
tract cattle ahead of schedule only when price is expected to decrease. An interior 
solution with qct < Nt must satisfy the first order condition
which can hold only if Et-2[pt – pt-1] > 0: It is optimal for the packer to postpone the 
delivery of contract cattle only when price is expected to increase+ Implicit differ-
entiation of either first order condition yields the same result: 
Contract cattle deliveries in week t are inversely related to the expectation, 
formed in week t - 2, of pt – pt-1.
The forgoing analysis assumed that contract deliveries are scheduled two 
weeks in advance+ If the actual delay between scheduling and delivery is one 
week, the appropriately amended analysis would have returned a very similar 
result: Contract deliveries in week t are inversely related to Et-1[pt] – pt-1. 
4. Empirical Testing
The models of the previous section yield the following hypothesis: The vol-
ume of marketing agreement or forward contract cattle delivered in a given 
week, week t, say, tends, other things equal, to be negatively correlated with a 
previously formed expectation of the change in price between weeks t - 1 and t. 
The “other things equal” qualification is a reminder that many other factors in-
fluence feeders’ and packers’ decisions about the number of non-cash cattle to 
deliver in a given week and, to the extent possible, we should control for these 
factors in our regression-based tests of the hypothesis. Among these factors, for 
the case of marketing agreement cattle, are the generic factors affecting the ar-
bitrage costs that feeders would incur as a result of off-schedule delivery. As 
noted in the previous section, these depend, to some extent, on variables such 
as feed and feeder cattle prices and interest rates. The Choice-Select spread is 
another generic determinant of arbitrage costs because it is reflective of the cost 
that feeders and packers would pay for the sub-optimal quality of off-schedule 
deliveries of non-cash cattle.
Other factors affecting delivery-scheduling decisions are specific to the indi-
vidual feeder or packer. For example, a particular feeder’s week t - 2 decision 
about the number of head to deliver in week t will be influenced by its number 
captive supplies and cash market prices for fed cattle     355
of t-ready cattle, and by its number of t - 1-ready cattle (if any) for which deliv-
ery was deferred to week t. From a particular packer’s point of view, the num-
ber of contract cattle to call in a given week depends, in large part, on its current 
inventory of contract cattle; that is, the total volume of cattle initially under con-
tract for delivery at some time during the current month minus any that have al-
ready been delivered. These factors will tend to introduce autoregressive patterns 
in weekly delivery numbers, which we can control, to some extent, by incorporat-
ing lagged delivery volumes as explanatory variables. 
The hypothesis will be tested using the following regression models, which 
will be estimated using the GIPSA–Texas Panhandle data: 
 
(1)
 
(2)
 
(3)
where QMt (QCt) is the number of marketing agreement ~forward contract! cat-
tle delivered to the four plants combined in week t. pt represents week t’s average 
spot market price of steers in the regional market.17 Es [pτ] denotes the expecta-
tion, formed in week s, of week τ’s value of price. crnpt and fcpt are week t’s prices 
for cattle feed and feeder cattle in the Texas Panhandle region. rt is an interest rate 
in week t. csspt is the Choice-Select spread for week t. The models’ explanatory 
variables also include one or more lags of the dependent variable. The εits are ran-
dom error terms. With respect to the delivery of marketing agreement cattle, the 
hypothesis implies a negative value for α1 in equation (1). Because there is some 
ambiguity about the representative lag between scheduling and delivery in the 
case of forward contract cattle, the implications here are not as sharp. In the event 
that the representative lag is 2 weeks, the hypothesis implies a negative value for 
α1 in equation (2). If the delivery lag is closer to 1 week, we would expect a nega-
tive value for α1 in equation (3).
To estimate equations (1), (2), and (3), we must first address the question of 
how decision makers will form their two-week-ahead forecasts of the week-to-
week change in price (Et-2[pt – pt-1]) and their one-week-ahead forecast of price 
(Et-1 [pt]). One conventional approach to modeling expectations uses the series of 
fitted values from a regression of actual values of the variable to be forecast on a 
set of variables that are thought to be relevant to the determination of the fore-
cast variable and were observable to decision makers in the week in which the 
forecast was formed. In that spirit, we posit the following two-week-ahead price 
change forecasting equation: 
17 More precise definitions of variables appear in the Appendix. 
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(4) 
and the following one-week-ahead price forecasting equation: 
 (5)
where, again, pt represents the region’s average spot market price of cattle in 
week t. Δfpt is the change in the price of week t’s “nearby” live cattle futures con-
tract from the first reporting day of week t - 1 to the first reporting day of week t. 
valt is the average box beef cutout value for week t. cft is the number of cattle on 
feed in Texas feed yards in week t. cplt is the number of cattle placed on feed in 
Texas feed yards during week t. lcplt is a simple average of the values of cpls for s 
values corresponding to 20, 21, 22, and 23, weeks prior to week t. This variable is 
intended to provide a rough indication of the number of cattle that may be reach-
ing market weight in feed yards serving the four plants in the GIPSA–Texas Pan-
handle study.18 rt ,crnpt ,and fcpt were defined previously. The µit terms are ran-
dom errors. 
Equations (4) and (5) were estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) using 67 
weekly observations.19 Each equation was tested for serial correlation in the er-
ror term and the hypothesis of no serial correlation could not be rejected in either 
case.20 OLS regression results are reported in Tables 1 and 2. 
In the analysis of equations (1), (2), and (3), Et-2[pt – pt-1] is taken to be the series 
of fitted values from OLS estimation of equation (4) and Et-1[pt] is taken to be the 
series of fitted values from OLS estimation of equation (5).This approach to mod-
eling expectation formation is subject to the customary criticisms. Few, if any, of 
the real market participants actually use an econometric model to develop their 
forecasts, so our approach appears to attribute to the decision-makers an unreal-
istically high degree of analytical ability. In reality, agents’ expectations about the 
future path of price are based on an understanding of the market mechanism that 
is probably more intuitive than analytical. To discover agents’ true expectations, 
one could imagine conducting an ongoing opinion survey that asked them to re-
port their guesses about future price movements, but data of this nature are sim-
ply unavailable. So we must resort to some sort of proxy for agents’ expectations. 
Presumably, the intuition upon which actual expectations is based reflects empir-
18 Number of days on feed varies widely depending on the condition of cattle at placement and, to 
some extent, the season of the year. One hundred and fifty days (approximately 21 weeks) is a rep-
resentative average figure with a range of about 120 days to about 180 days. 
19 The GIPSA–Texas Panhandle data contain essentially complete records on the lots of cattle killed by 
the four plants during a 67-week time span from the week of February 5,1995 through the week of 
May 12,1996. Equations (4) and (5) were estimated over the samples required to generate the expec-
tation proxies needed in equations (1), (2), and (3). 
20 Testing for serial correlation in the errors of these equations is complicated by the presence of 
lagged dependent variables among the regressors. We used a procedure (Greene, 2000, section 
13.5.3) that is a modification of the Breusch-Godfrey test. It involves regressing the residuals from 
OLS estimation on the original equation’s explanatory variables and several lags of the residuals. 
A standard F-test of the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the lagged residuals are all zero 
amounts to a test of no serial correlation. 
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ical regularities observable in the data. Our econometric forecasting models, then, 
are really just a convenient way of summarizing these empirical regularities. 
The use of forecasts derived from econometric models as proxies for agents’ ex-
pectations raises a secondary question. Should the expectation proxies be in-sam-
ple forecasts or out-of-sample forecasts; that is, forecasts based on regression coeffi-
cient estimates from the sub-sample that entirely pre-dates the week in which each 
Table 1. Results of Ordinary Least Squares Estimation of Equation (4), the Two-Week-
Ahead Price Change Forecasting Equation
 Dependent variable = pt – pt-1 Number of observations = 67 
 F-stat [P-value] = 1.85 [0.067] R2 = 0.270
Explanatory Parameter Standard t-statistic for H0: 
variable estimate error parameter = 0 
Intercept -5.7448 13.9907 -0.41 
pt-2 -0.6257 0.1941 -3.22
pt–3 0.5790 0.2165 2.67
pt-4 -0.1178 0.1559 -0.76
Δfpt-2 0.1981 0.1869 1.06 
valt-2 -0.0415 0.1204 0.34 
rt-2 1.0735 2.5808 0.42 
cft-2 0.0016 0.0037 0.44 
fcpt-2 0.0874 0.1362 0.64 
crnpt-2 0.9642 0.9770 0.99 
cplt-2 0.0120 0.0075 1.59 
lcplt 0.0050 0.0152 0.33 
Note. Definitions of variables are provided in the Appendix. 
Table 2. Results of Ordinary Least Squares Estimation of Equation (5), the One-Week-
Ahead Price Level Forecasting Equation 
 Dependent variable = pt Number of observations = 67
 F-stat [P-value] = 46.44 [<0.0001] R2 = 0.903 
Explanatory Parameter Standard t-statistic for H0: 
Variable estimate error parameter = 0
Intercept -2.0996 12.4557 -0.17 
pt-1 1.2640 0.1789 7.06 
pt-2 -0.6210 0.2040 -3.04 
pt-3 0.2546 0.1431 1.78 
Δfpt-1 -0.4762 0.1768 -2.69 
valt-1 -0.0889 0.1131 -0.79 
rt-1 -1.4208 1.9498 -0.73 
cft-1 0.0021 0.0030 0.71 
fcpt-1 0.2335 0.1214 1.92 
crnpt-1 1.1682 0.8845 1.32 
cplt-1 0.0143 0.0076 1.88 
lcplt -0.0040 0.0115 -0.35 
Note. Definitions of variables are provided in the Appendix. 
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forecast is made? The comparative virtues of these two alternative approaches have 
been debated for years. Our use of the in-sample approach has several precedents 
including the seminal paper by Barro (1977) and a recent paper by Borenstein and 
Shepard (1996). We note, however, that our replication of the analysis using out-of-
sample forecasts from equation (4) produced results that did not support the mod-
els’ hypothesis of a negative value for α1 in equations (1) and (2). These forecasts 
were virtually uncorrelated with the actual price changes and the estimates of α1 in 
equations (1) and (2) were insignificant. Finally, the assumption of perfect foresight 
is yet another approach sometimes used in modeling expectations. When the actual 
future values of price changes were used in equations (1), (2), and (3) in place of the 
expectations, the results were more strongly supportive of the hypothesis than the 
results obtained using in-sample forecasts from equations (4) and (5). 
Having used forecasting equations (4) and (5) to develop proxies for the expec-
tations, equations (1), (2), and (3) were estimated by ordinary least squares using 
a data set reduced, by the requirement of data on two lags of the dependent vari-
able, to 65 useable observations. Consistency of OLS relies on the assumption of 
zero correlation between the explanatory variables and the contemporaneous er-
ror terms. In equation (1), for example, QMt , which is determined in period t - 2, 
is regressed on a set of variables including several (Et-2[pt – pt-1], crnpt-2, fcpt-2, rt-2, 
and csspt-2) that are also dated t – 2. Simultaneity in the determination of the set of 
week t - 2 variables could introduce correlations between the explanatory variables 
and ε1t , rendering OLS estimates inconsistent. To check for this possibility, we con-
ducted Hausman tests of the pre-determinedness of week t - 2 explanatory vari-
ables in equations (1) and (2), and week t - 1 explanatory variables in equation (3). 
The method of these tests involves a comparison of OLS estimates with two-stage 
least squares estimates obtained using lagged values of explanatory variables as in-
struments. The hypothesis of pre-determinedness of the regressors could not be re-
jected at conventional significance levels for any of the three equations. Each equa-
tion was also tested for error-term serial correlation using the method applied to 
equations (4) and (5) and the hypothesis of no serial correlation could not be re-
jected for any one of the three equations. OLS estimation results are reported in Ta-
ble 3. The t-statistics reported in Table 3 are based on heteroscedasticity consistent 
standard errors calculated using the Newey-West procedure. 
Our hypothesis implies negative values for the coefficients of the expected 
price change variables in equations (1), (2), and (3). In the case of equation (1)’s 
model of marketing agreement deliveries, the estimate of α1 is negative and statis-
tically significant with a marginal significance level of 0.001 (in a two-tailed test). 
To interpret the magnitude of the coefficient estimate, consider that the distribu-
tion, over the 67-week sample period, of the actual week-to-week price changes 
had a slightly negative mean and a range of roughly $-3.26/cwt. to $3.55/cwt. 
The standard deviation was approximately $1.47/cwt. The distribution of the 
weekly total (four-plants-combined) marketing agreement delivery volume had 
a mean of 19,326 head and a standard deviation of 4,923 head. The estimate of α1 
in equation (1)(-2,009.5), therefore, implies that an expected price increase of one 
sample standard deviation would trigger a decrease in weekly marketing agree-
ment delivery volume of 0.60 (= 2,009.5 * 1.47/4,923) standard deviations. Thus, 
the effect of expected price changes on delivery scheduling incentives would ap-
pear to play a relatively significant role in explaining the week-to-week variation 
in marketing agreement delivery volume. 
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In the cases of equations’ (2) and (3) models of forward contract deliveries, 
the estimates of α1 are both negative but with marginal significance levels of only 
0.179 and 0.213 (in two-tailed tests), respectively. The mean and standard devia-
tion of the sample’s distribution of weekly forward contract delivery volume are 
4,819 and 5,328, respectively. Thus, taking equation (2)’s point estimate of α1 as 
representative, an expected price increase of one standard deviation would re-
sult in a 0.22 (= 786.09 * 1.47/5328) standard deviation decrease in the weekly 
forward contract delivery volume. In contrast to the marketing agreement case, 
there is weaker statistical support for the hypothesis in the forward contract case. 
The magnitude of the effect, if present, would also appear to be smaller. 
Table 3. Results of Ordinary Least Squares Estimation of Equations (1), (2), and (3); the 
Captive Supply Delivery Volume Equations 
Explanatory variable       Equation (1)                    Equation (2)                 Equation (3) 
Intercept 33418. 4586.1 5134.1
 (1.67) (0.54) (0.55)
Et-2[pt – pt-1] -2009.5 -786.09
 (-3.35) (-1.34)
Et-1[pt] – pt-1   -788.29
   (-1.24)
crnpt-2 -1346.3
 (-0.63)
fcpt-2 57.500
 (0.24)
rt-2 -5029.1 120.09
 (-1.82) (0.07)
csspt-2 -138.25 -351.97
 (-1.12) (-2.37)
rt-1   -2.9317
   (-0.00)
csspt-1   -332.08
   (-2.42)
QMt-1 0.45394
 (3.59)
QMt-2 0.27840
 (2.00) 
QCt-1  0.47182 0.45005
  (2.06) (1.94)
QCt-2  -0.10391 -0.08562
  (-1.25) (-0.98) 
R2 0.565 0.332 0.333
Dependent variable = QMt (equation (1)) or QCt (equations (2) and (3)). Number of obser-
vations = 65.
Note. t-statistics, based on Newey-West heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors, are 
given in parentheses.
Definitions of variables are provided in the Appendix.
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5. Summary and Conclusions
A number of papers in the agricultural economics literature have investigated 
the connection between the use of non-cash, or “captive” supply, procurement 
sources of fed cattle and the price in the residual cash market. One aspect of this 
inquiry is the characterization of the empirical relationship between captive sup-
ply delivery volume and cash market prices. Past work of this nature has focused 
on the correlation between contemporaneous levels of captive supply shipments 
and cash market prices. Considerable evidence of a negative correlation has been 
found: In weeks in which captive delivery volume is high, spot market price 
tends, other things equal, to be low. 
With this report’s econometric tests, we have sought evidence of a captive sup-
ply-cash price relationship of a different nature. The search was motivated by two 
stylized models of packers’ and feeders’ cattle delivery-scheduling decisions. The 
models predict a negative correlation between the volume of marketing agreement 
or forward contract deliveries in a given week, and an ex ante forecast of the change 
in price from its level of the previous week. Some work using the GIPSA–Texas 
Panhandle data revealed evidence of this kind of empirical regularity in the case of 
marketing agreement shipments. In the case of forward contract shipments, the sta-
tistical evidence is less convincing. For both cases, however, the findings are sensi-
tive to the choice of a proxy for agents’ expectations of price changes. 
The impact of captive supplies on cash market prices for fed cattle is an is-
sue of considerable interest to market participants and government policy mak-
ers. The robust empirical finding of a negative correlation between captive deliv-
eries and price has attracted considerable attention, particularly from those who 
promote it as evidence that the use of captive supply procurement methods is re-
sponsible for low prices in the cash market. We believe, however, that the policy 
relevance of this empirical regularity is by no means clear. More careful examina-
tion of the underlying economic mechanisms of the fed cattle market is needed. 
This study falls short of a thorough analysis of those mechanisms. It does, how-
ever, raise a new possibility: The pattern of covariation, in weekly time series 
data, between captive supply delivery volume and cash market prices for fed cat-
tle may be, in part, a reflection of the inter-temporal arbitrage opportunities avail-
able to packers and feeders in scheduling cattle delivery. It is not clear whether 
the observed negative correlation between the levels of price and captive ship-
ments could be an artifact of these delivery timing incentives, but we believe that 
it is important that future studies of price dynamics in fed cattle markets take the 
role of delivery timing decisions into account. 
6. Appendix: Definitions of Variables
QMt (QCt) : The number of head of marketing agreement (forward contract) cattle deliv-
ered to the four plants in the GIPSA–Texas Panhandle study in week t. (Head) 
pt : The spot market price of cattle in the relevant regional market in week t. For each re-
porting day in week t, we obtained the AMS reported weighted-average price of steers, 
1,100–1,250 lb. live weight category, in lots grading 35–65% Select or Choice, for the 
Western Oklahoma–Texas Panhandle region; and the number of head upon which 
each reported price is based. pt is then defined as the head-weighted average of daily 
average prices for reporting days in week t. ($/cwt., live weight basis). 
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∆fpt : The change in the price of week t’s “nearby” Chicago Mercantile Exchange live cat-
tle futures contract from the first reporting day of week t - 1 to the first reporting day of 
week t. The nearby contract for week t is the earliest contract still trading in week t un-
less its end-of-trade date occurs during week t. In that event, the next contract is taken 
as the nearby contract. ($/cwt.) 
valt : Simple average of AMS reported box beef cutout values for “light Choice,” “heavy 
Choice,” “light Select,” and “heavy Select” for week t. ($/cwt.) 
rt : An average of daily values for the 6-month Treasury bill rate in secondary markets for 
days in week t. (%) 
cft : The number of cattle on feed in week t in Texas feed yards with capacity of 1,000 head 
or more. The National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) reports cattle on feed on 
the first day of each month. These values were assigned to the weeks containing the 
months’ first days. Figures for the remaining weeks were estimated by linear interpo-
lation. (1,000 head) 
cplt : The number of cattle placed on feed in week t in Texas feed yards with capacity of 
1,000 head or more. NASS reports cattle placements on a monthly basis only. Weekly 
cattle placements were estimated using the assumption that the number placed during 
each month was uniformly distributed across days of the month. (1,000 head) 
lcplt : A simple average of weekly cattle placements (values of cpls) for weeks 20, 21, 22, 
and 23 weeks prior to week t. (1,000 head) 
fcpt : AMS reported price of feeder cattle (medium and large frame, #1, 600–650 lbs.) in the 
Amarillo auction market in week t. ($/cwt.) 
crnpt : The price of #2 yellow corn in the “Triangle” area (Plainview to Canyon to Farwell 
Texas). A simple average of daily prices for days in week t. ($/bu.) 
csspt : AMS reported boxed beef cutout spread, Choice-Select, 500–700 lbs. yield grades 
2–3, for week t. ($/cwt.) 
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